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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996). 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issues of law are reviewed under a correctness standard, without deference to 
the trial court. Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115 (Utah 1998). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about June 8, 1999, the legislative body of Salt Lake City enacted 
Ordinance No. 40 of 1999, later embodied in the Salt Lake City Code as 12.12.090, 
hereinafter referred to as the "Cruising ordinance." A complete copy of the Cruising 
ordinance is included in the Addendum to this brief. The Cruising ordinance defines 
"cruising" as "the driving of a motor vehicle more than two times between the hours 
of 11:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m., in a particular direction, past a traffic control point." Salt 
Lake City Code 12.12.090 §B.) The effective date of the ordinance was June 15, 1999. 
Prior to enforcement, signs were posted at regular intervals along the no 
cruising route. (Eight signs between South Temple and 2100 South for both 
northbound and southbound traffic on State Street.) Each sign defines the area in 
bright red as a "No Cruising Zone" and specifically defines the offense: "Traffic 
Congested Area / No Cruising Zone / No Vehicle May Pass a Control Point in a 
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Particular Direction More Than 2 Times Between the Hours of 11 PM - 4 AM." A 
public information campaign, including passing out approximately 2,000 flyers to 
"cruisers," preceded enforcement. Media coverage of the ordinance enactment and 
planned enforcement was extensive. In addition to newspaper and radio coverage, 
local television news programs aired 55 spots about the ordinance between June 7, 
1999, and July 2, 1999 (the day before enforcement began). Reply to Defendant's 
"Response to Plaintiff's Court Arguments and Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities" at 12, footnote 5. 
On or about July 9, 1999, Appellant received a citation for violating the 
Cruising ordinance. Between September 3, 1999, and January 10, 2000, various 
memoranda were filed by Appellant and the prosecution, and oral argument was held 
on several dates. On January 10 the trial court issued its ruling, upholding the 
constitutionality of the Cruising ordinance, in the form of a Minute Entry and Order. 
Appellant stipulated that he had in fact committed the elements of the offense, was 
convicted of the offense of violating the Cruising ordinance, and this appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT HAS NOT FULFILLED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Appellant has not fulfilled the requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure concerning transcripts of trial court proceedings. No transcript was ever 
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provided to Appellee. As far as Appellee is aware, no certificate was ever filed to 
indicate that there would be no further request for transcripts. Since the record does 
not include a transcript to provide evidentiary support, Appellant has failed to marshal 
his evidence sufficiently to merit appellate review. 
II. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE INADEQUATELY BRIEFED 
The Brief of Appellant consists of the same broad, hyperbolic assertions found 
in Appellant's memoranda at the trial court level. For the most part, Appellant's brief 
consists of declarations of the broadest possible nature concerning his political beliefs 
and his own interpretations of the place of federal and state constitutions in American 
law. No authority or legal analysis has been provided. Due to the inadequacy of the 
Appellant's briefing, the issues before the court are too broad and too vague to merit 
further review or oral argument. 
III. THE CRUISING ORDINANCE WAS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SALT LAKE CITY'S 
POLICE POWERS AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATE LAW 
Salt Lake City has been legislatively granted police powers to enact ordinances 
in the interests of public health, safety and welfare. Prior to the enactment of Salt Lake 
City Code 12.12.090, the City Council conducted a public hearing and made certain 
legislative findings. Those findings reveal the serious problems that have been linked 
to the practice of cruising in Salt Lake City. The City Council found that elimination 
of cruising between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. would result in an 
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elimination of many of the safety problems and much, if not all, of the traffic 
congestion, noise, and "road rage," during those hours. The exercise of police powers 
by the City's legislative body to address the concerns of public health, safety, and 
welfare were consistent with the general grant of power contained in the enabling 
statutes of the Utah Code. 
IV. APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A JURY 
Under state law and under the Salt Lake City Code, an infraction carries no 
possibility of incarceration. Appellant's request for a jury trial, therefore, was contrary 
to established law. Even if, arguendo, a jury was appropriate for an infraction-level 
offense, a panel of jurors cannot determine an issue of constitutional law. Since 
Appellant admitted culpability of the factual elements of the offense, all that remained 
were legal issues which would have been decided by the trial judge even if a jury had 
been impaneled. 
V. SALT LAKE CITY'S CRUISING ORDINANCE MEETS ALL CONSTITUTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
A presumption of constitutionality applies to the decisions of legislative bodies. 
One challenging a municipal ordinance has the burden to overcome the presumption 
of validity and constitutionality. Appellant has provided little or no analysis in his 
brief, let alone an analysis that meets this burden. His reference to the Tenth 
Amendment is misplaced, as that amendment is a restriction on federal power. His 
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reference to freedom of expression is completely unsubstantiated. To show that 
conduct is expressive conduct that is protected by the First Amendment, there must be 
an evidenced intent to convey a particularized message through the conduct and a 
substantial likelihood that the intended message would be understood by those who 
viewed it. Appellant has shown neither of these elements. 
With regard to Appellant's assertions as to the free exercise of religion, "while 
the 'truth' of a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant question 
whether it is 'truly held.'" United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,185 (1965). The bald 
assertions in the Brief of Appellant that cruising could be religious to someone is not 
sufficient to merit appellate review. Similarly, Appellant has not met his burden in 
asserting a violation of the Equal Protection clauses. Even if, arguendo, we assume 
that the Cruising ordinance creates a classification of "people who cruise," this does 
not mean that the classification is unconstitutional. No suspect or quasi-suspect 
classification of persons is involved here. Furthermore, the record contains no 
evidence indicating that the Cruising ordinance is not rationally based. 
Appellant claims that the Cruising ordinance violates unenumerated rights of 
the United States Constitution. As the federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals and 
other appellate courts have found, however, even if a right of intrastate travel exists, 
that right is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Salt Lake 
6 
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City's Cruising ordinance is a narrowly tailored ordinance that satisfies all 
constitutional concerns. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT HAS NOT FULFILLED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
First, Appellee renews its objection (first tendered in Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Disposition) to the untimely filing of the docketing statement in this matter. 
Pursuant to Rule 9(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the docketing 
statement was due February 28, 2000, 21 days after the filing of the Notice of Appeal. 
Defendant/Appellant Kenneth R. Larsen (hereinafter, "Appellant") failed to file said 
docketing statement until March 16, 2000, 18 days past the due date. Appellant's only 
excuse for this delay was "inexperience." Response to Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Disposition and Supporting Memorandum at 1. From the earliest 
proceedings in this matter, Appellant (and, for a time, his attorney) have expected 
either the trial court or the prosecution to assist, excuse, or explain one aspect or 
another of trial and motion practice. The on-site training of legal hobbyists is not and 
should not be the job of the courts or any other component of the judicial system. 
Appellant's expectations throughout this case have been unfair both to the 
practitioners in that system and to the citizens of Utah and Salt Lake City. 
7 
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Second, Appellant has not fulfilled the requirements of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure concerning transcripts of trial court proceedings. 
Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing 
the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the court 
executive a transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already 
on file as the appellant deems necessary. The request shall be in 
writing and shall state that the transcript is needed for purposes of 
an appeal. ... If no such parts of the proceedings are to be 
requested, within the same period the appellant shall file a 
certificate to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy 
with the clerk of the appellate court. 
Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(1). Appellant purportedly filed a Request for Transcript 
on February 17, 2000. That Request sought only a transcript of proceedings on 
January 10, 2000, on which date no argument was presented. In any event, no 
transcript was ever provided to Appellee. As far as Appellee is aware, no certificate 
was ever filed to indicate that there would be no further request for transcript. A 
transcript of all proceedings in this matter is required for this Court to have a full 
sense of the nature of Appellant's arguments, and the extraordinary efforts extended 
by the trial court and the prosecution to address Appellant's rambling, unfocused, and 
unsupported assertions. 
Although the arguments in the Brief of Appellant are constitutional challenges, 
several of his challenges require a factual foundation. 
Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding 
or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a 
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the 
8 
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evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of 
all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the 
court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's 
deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript. 
Id., 11(e)(2). Appellant is urging that the trial court's conclusion of constitutionality is 
contrary to the evidence. Without any supporting evidence in the record, Appellant has 
made bald assertions that cruising is a constitutionally protected form of expression 
and a religious exercise. Brief of Appellant and Defendant (hereinafter "Br. of 
Appellant") at 17-21. Bald assertions are not evidence. 
No evidentiary record has been provided to support either of these propositions. 
There is no record to indicate that cruising, let alone cruising at the specific times, 
places, and manner prohibited by Salt Lake City Code 12.12.090, has been used by 
any individual to convey a particularized message. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397 (1989). There is no record to indicate that cruising as prohibited by Salt Lake 
City ordinance is a religious exercise for any individual. See, e.g., United States v. 
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,185-86, 85 S.Ct. 850, 864 (1965). Since no transcript has been 
provided as evidentiary support, Appellant has failed to marshal his evidence 
sufficiently to merit appellate review. See, e.g., State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, \A\, 
370 Utah Adv. Rep. 11. 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE INADEQUATELY BRIEFED 
Appellant has not provided a transcript of any court proceedings in this matter. 
Therefore the record on appeal is limited to the "original papers and exhibits filed in 
the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 11(a). 
As anticipated in Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition, the Brief of 
Appellant consists of the same broad, hyperbolic assertions found in Appellant's 
memoranda at the trial court level. Those memoranda included the "Response to 
Plaintiff's Court Arguments and Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities" 
(hereinafter "Appellant's Response"), the "Defendant's Memorandum and Points of 
Authority" (hereinafter "Appellant's Memorandum"), and the "Addendum to 
Defendant's Memorandum and Points of Authority." In responsive memoranda and in 
court proceedings, Appellee argued repeatedly that Appellant's arguments were 
inadequately briefed, and moved the trial court to strike Appellant's motion on that 
basis. The trial court denied these requests. See, e.g., Minute Entry and Order at 1. 
Therefore Appellee has borne the responsibility for both developing and opposing 
Appellant's arguments. 
Appellant evidently expects to continue this approach in his appeal. Points I 
through IV of his brief are simply declarations, of the broadest possible nature, of 
Appellant's political beliefs and his own interpretations of the place of federal and 
state constitutions in American law. Even these broad declarations are not associated 
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in any specific way to Salt Lake City's Cruising ordinance. For instance, in point IV 
of his brief, Appellant states that he "intends to demonstrate" that the infraction 
Cruising offense is "similarly oppressive and unconstitutional" to a hypothetical law 
making Judaism a capital offense. Br. of Appellant at 11. No authority or legal 
analysis is ever provided, however, even when Appellant returns to the subject of 
constitutionality in his points VII and VIII. Again, Appellant expects his opinions to 
be sufficient. 
The argument [section of an appellate brief] shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not 
preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on. 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
With the exceptions of points VI and VIIID. 1., the only authorities cited in the 
Brief of Appellant are the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the United States. 
Point VI refers almost exclusively to archaic law while ignoring ruling precedents. Br. 
of Appellant at 13-15. Point VIII, subsection D. 1., cites one recent United States 
Supreme Court decision but provides no analysis to put the quotations in context or 
link it to the ordinance at issue. Id. at 22. The rest of point VIII is limited to the same 
kind of broad, unsubstantiated claims of unconstitutionality that were set forth in 
Appellant's memoranda at the trial level. For example, in section A of Appellant's 
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point VIII, Appellant seeks First Amendment protection for cruising with the 
following two paragraphs: 
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of 
speech," (US [sic] Constitution, Amendment I) "All men have 
the inherent and inalienable right... to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions," (Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 1) 
and "No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press." (Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 15) 
Cruising is a way of announcing one's arrival. It is more than 
just driving a car down a street. It is about being seen by one's 
peers and meeting new friends. It is a cultural gathering, 
sprinkled with a bit of youthful and (hopefully) healthy rebellion. 
Appellant asserts that Salt Lake City's Cruising ordinance 
restricts free speech. 
Id. at 17. This is the whole of Appellant's analysis urging this Court to apply the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution in an unusual and unprecedented 
manner. 
Appellee and this Court are evidently expected not only to do Appellant's 
research, but also to form his broad declarations into a pertinent legal analysis. Such 
expectations are not permissible. "It is well settled that a reviewing court will not 
address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Jacoby, 1999 UT App 52, 
^[18, 975 P.2d 939, 944. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly clarified this 
principle, as seen in these remarks: 
We have made clear that this court is not "'a depository in which 
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research.'" State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) 
(quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 92 111. App. 3d 1087, 416 N.E.2d 
12 
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783, 784, 48 111. Dec. 510 (111. 1981)). We further clarified the 
requirements of rule 24(a)(9) in the recent case of State v. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998), where we stated that rule 
24(a)(9) "implicitly ... requires not just bald citation to authority 
but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on 
that authority." Id. at 305. 
State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1,131, 973 P.2d 404, 410. See also, Burns v. Summerhays, 
927 P.2d 197 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), and State ex rel C.Yv. Yates, 834 P.2d 69 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). 
In Jaeger, the appellant cited "relevant constitutional provisions" and case law, 
but "his brief otherwise lacked any meaningful analysis of this authority." Id. The 
Court therefore declined to consider his constitutional arguments. As to Appellant's 
points in the present case, however, the Brief of Appellant more closely parallels the 
situation in Jacoby, where (as to one issue) the "brief contained] no legal analysis or 
authority..." Jacoby at [^18 (emphasis added). 
Due to the inadequacy of the Appellant's briefing, the issues before the court 
are too broad and too vague to merit further review or oral argument. 
III. T H E CRUISING ORDINANCE WAS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SALT LAKE CITY'S 
POLICE POWERS AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATE LAW 
Appellee will not respond individually to points I through IV of the Brief of 
Appellant. Those sections do not actually raise or address any point at issue. 
Collectively, these sections seem to aver that a law which is found to be 
13 
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unconstitutional under the Constitution of the United States should be stricken. In 
point VII, Appellant appears to take that principle even further, suggesting that no law 
is constitutional unless a constitutional provision expressly permits it. ("Appellant 
asserts that the power to prohibit cruising ... has not been granted by any constitution 
to the State of Utah or any of its political subdivisions." Br. of Appellant at 16.) 
This brief is not the place to set forth a lesson on the hierarchical format of 
American democracy and jurisprudence. However, the Cruising ordinance was 
adopted in full compliance with state law. Salt Lake City has been legislatively 
granted police powers to enact ordinances in the interests of public health, safety and 
welfare. Those powers include the following: 
They [municipalities] may pass all ordinances and rules, and 
make all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for 
carrying into effect or discharging all powers and duties 
conferred by this chapter, and as are necessary and proper to 
provide for the safety and preserve the health, and promote the 
prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort, 
and convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for the 
protection of property in the city; ... 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 (emphasis added). 
They [municipalities] may regulate the movement of traffic on the 
streets, sidewalks and public places, including the movement of 
pedestrians as well as of vehicles, and the cars ... and may 
prevent racing and immoderate driving or riding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-30 (emphases added). 
[Municipalities] ... may declare what shall be a nuisance, and 
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abate the same, and impose fines upon persons who may create, 
continue or suffer nuisances to exist. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-60. 
They [municipalities] may prohibit or regulate ... amusements or 
practices having a tendency to annoy persons passing in the 
streets or on sidewalks, ... or to interfere with traffic. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-69. 
They [municipalities] ... may prevent the ringing of bells, 
blowing of horns and bugles, crying of goods by auctioneers and 
others, and the making of other noises, for the purpose of 
business, amusement or otherwise, and prevent all performances 
and devices tending to the collection of persons on the streets or 
sidewalks of the city. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-76 (emphases added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently held that these grants 
of police powers should be read liberally. Cities are to be given the widest latitude to 
act in the public interest. See, e.g., State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d. 1116 (Utah 1980); 
Boulder Mountain Lodge Inc. v. Town of Boulder, 1999 UT 67, 983 P.2d 570. 
Prior to the enactment of Salt Lake City ordinance 12.12.090, the City Council 
conducted a public hearing and made certain legislative findings. Those findings, 
which were subsequently incorporated in the ordinance {see Addendum, infra), reveal 
the serious problems that have been linked to the practice of cruising in Salt Lake 
City. Those problems include: homicides, fights, assaults, confrontations between 
gang members, traffic congestion and gridlock, and excessive noise. The City Council 
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found that elimination of cruising between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. 
would result in an elimination of many of the safety problems and much, if not all, of 
the traffic congestion, noise, and "road rage," during those hours. 
The exercise of police powers by the City's legislative body to address the 
concerns of public health, safety, and welfare were absolutely consistent with the 
general grant of power contained in Utah Code § 10-8-84 and the enabling statutes 
cited above. 
IV. APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A JURY 
The violation of the Cruising ordinance was an infraction. Under state law, the 
maximum penalty for an infraction is a $750.00 fine with no possibility of 
incarceration (Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-205 and 76-3-301 (l)(e)) and under the Salt 
Lake City Code, a $500.00 maximum fine with no possibility of incarceration (Salt 
Lake City Code § 1.12.050). The bail schedule for a violation of Salt Lake City 
ordinance 12.12.090 was $117.00. Minute Entry and Order at 2. Appellant's request 
for a jury trial—raised in points V and VI of the Brief of Appellant—was contrary to 
established law and was properly denied. 
It is well established that the right to a jury trial is triggered by 
the type of punishment a defendant faces. See, e.g., Lewis v. U.S., 
518 U.S. 322, 135 L. Ed. 2d 590, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2167 (1996) 
(noting Supreme Court case law has established that when 
defendant is charged with petty crime carrying maximum six 
month prison term, Constitution does not guarantee right to jury 
trial). Section 77-1-6 (2) (e) [of the Utah Code] reflects this 
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general rule by providing for a jury trial except when a defendant 
is charged with an infraction and therefore cannot possibly be 
sentenced to prison. 
West Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Appellant has failed to provide an analysis of the cited state constitutional 
provisions to show how they apply or why they would supercede federal law on this 
issue. Br. of Appellant at 12. "'Because appellants failed to develop any meaningful 
state constitutional argument below, our analysis must proceed solely under federal 
constitutional law."' McDonald at 375, quoting State v. Dudley, 847 P.2d 424, 426 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). See also part II of this brief, "Appellant's Arguments are 
Inadequately Briefed," supra. 
Furthermore, it is clear that Appellant sought a jury not as an alternate trier of 
fact, but in order to present arguments of constitutional law to the jury. At the trial 
level, Appellant clarified this intention several times. In his "Stipulation of the Facts" 
filed with the trial court on September 3, 1999, for instance, Appellant admitted 
culpability as to the factual elements of the offense. He repeated those admissions in 
Appellant's Response (point 5, §§A-D). Point 8, §A, of Appellant's Response 
clarified this intention: "Although ordinary citizens may not understand all the details 
regarding constitutionality and case law, Defendant is confident a majority of jurors 
can and will easily see that the Salt Lake City Cruising ordinance is tyrannical, 
overbroad, overbearing, unfair and just plain wrong." Appellant's Response, point 8, 
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§A. Further on, Appellant was even more explicit, expecting "...the People, 
assembled injuries, to define and defend this right [of a constitutional freedom of 
travel] ... ." Appellant's Response, point 8, §F. (Emphasis added.) And in his 
brief before this Court, Appellant acknowledges again that he "has stipulated [to] the 
facts and seeks to overturn a city ordinance on constitutional grounds." Br. of 
Appellant at 13. 
Even if, arguendo, a jury was appropriate for an infraction-level offense, a 
panel of jurors cannot determine an issue of constitutional law. "In a jury trial, 
questions of law are to be determined by the court, questions of fact by the jury." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-17-10(1). Since Appellant admitted culpability of the factual elements 
of the offense, all that remained were legal issues which would have been decided by 
the trial judge even if a jury had been impaneled. 
V. THE CRUISING ORDINANCE MEETS SATISFIES ALL CONSTITUTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
The Brief of Appellant does not provide sufficient constitutional analysis for 
Appellee to respond with the specificity that would usually be appropriate before this 
Court. {See part II of this brief, "Appellant's Arguments are Inadequately Briefed," 
supra.) Nevertheless, Appellant has cursorily raised the issue of constitutionality, 
therefore the following response is provided in an attempt to assist the Court as much 
as possible. Given the lack of analysis in the Brief of Appellant, however, the purpose 
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here is not to canvass all possible issues that could stem from Appellant's broad 
assertions, but rather to focus on those few colorable issues intimated in points VII 
and VIII of his brief.1 
A. Under the Principle Of Separation Of Powers, a Presumption of 
Constitutionality Applies to the Decisions of Legislative Bodies 
Municipal ordinances, like state statutes, are presumptively valid and 
constitutional. Professor McQuillin, in his respected treatise on municipal 
corporations, has stated: 
No ordinance or law will be declared unconstitutional unless 
clearly so, and every reasonable [effort] will be made to sustain 
it. Not only must unconstitutionality appear clear, but, it has been 
asserted, it must appear and be proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
... If the constitutional questions raised are fairly debatable, the 
court must declare the ordinance constitutional, as the court 
cannot and must not substitute its judgment for that of the local 
legislative body. 
5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 19.06 at 377-78 (3rd Ed. Rev.); see also, 
Id. § 19.14. The Utah Supreme Court has adopted this rule of construction. 
It [a municipal ordinance] should not be held to be invalid unless 
1
 As in preceding parts of this brief, Appellee does not attempt to extend the 
constitutional discussions to the state constitution. "'Because appellants failed to 
develop any meaningful state constitutional argument below, our analysis must 
proceed solely under federal constitutional law.'" West Valley City v. McDonald, 948 
P.2d 371, 375 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), quoting State v. Dudley, 847 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). (Emphasis added.) 
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it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt2 to be incompatible with 
some particular constitutional provision. 
Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035, 1037 (Utah 1975), cert. den. 425 U.S. 915, 
47 L.Ed.2d 766. 
This rule is based on the separation of powers concept. The Utah Supreme 
Court has observed: 
Because of the seriousness of judicial responsibility and having 
the final word in the inter-relationship with other departments 
and institutions of government, it is found to be wise and proper 
judicial policy to exercise its powers with restraint, and not to 
intrude or interfere with discretionary functions or the policies of 
other departments of government. 
Triangle Oil, Inc. v. North Salt Lake City Corp., 609 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Utah 1980). 
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the Court ruled that it would only interfere with such 
discretionary decisions if the City acted outside of its authority or if the City's actions 
were "wholly discordant to reason and justice." Id.; Wright Development, Inc. v. City 
ofWellsville, 608 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 1980); State v. Taylor, 541 P.2d 1121, 1125 
(Utah 1975); Mantua Town v. Carr, 584 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1978). 
Therefore one challenging a municipal ordinance has the burden to overcome 
the presumption of validity and constitutionality. Society of Separationists v. 
Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993). 
2
 This was a criminal case and also illustrates that the determination of an 
ordinance's validity is not altered by the government's burden to prove guilt beyond a 
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A party mounting such a challenge bears a heavy burden 
to overcome this presumption, and "'we resolve any 
reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality."' Dennis v. 
Summit County, 933 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1997) (quoting 
Society ofSeparationists, 870 P.2d at 920.) 
Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1248 (Utah 1998). Appellant has provided little or no 
analysis in his brief, let alone an analysis that meets this "heavy burden." Id. 
B. The Tenth Amendment is Irrelevant in this Context 
In point VII of Appellant's brief, Appellant claims that a presumption of 
constitutionality is invalid pursuant to the Tenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Defendant provides no case law and no substantive analysis. In any 
event, the Tenth Amendment is a restriction on federal power, and therefore has no 
relevance in the case at hand. 
It should be pointed out, however, that state legislators (elected by the citizens 
of Utah) created the enabling legislation that gives Salt Lake City its police powers. 
See part III of this brief, supra. Furthermore, the people of Salt Lake City, through 
their elected representatives, enacted the Cruising ordinance. Therefore the ordinance 
is perfectly in line with the Tenth Amendment's reservation of unenumerated rights to 
the states or the people. 
For an additional discussion of the unenumerated rights of the federal 
constitution, please refer to § F of this part, infra. 
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C. Cruising is Not a Protected Form of Expression 
Point VIII, section A, of the Brief of Appellant claims that the practice of 
cruising is a "Means of Communication" and is "more than just driving a car down a 
street." Br. of Appellant at 17. From this, Appellant's conclusion is that the Cruising 
ordinance "restricts free speech." Id. 
The concept of free speech has undergone a metamorphosis in recent decades, 
so that the Freedom of Speech clause now extends to some degree to conduct beyond 
the written and spoken word. The clause is now commonly referred to as "Freedom of 
Expression" rather than freedom of speech. To compensate for the expansion of the 
doctrine, the United States Supreme Court developed a hierarchical approach in 
matters of free expression. Expression of opinion in the printed form, as in books and 
newspapers, retains its historically favored position in First Amendment 
jurisprudence. This is particularly true for the expression of political opinion.. This sort 
of expression of opinion is considered a core value of the First Amendment and is 
known as "pure speech." On the other end of the spectrum from such "pure speech" 
are those matters where speech is joined with conduct, often with the conduct being 
the primary means of expression. These matters are generally referred to as "symbolic 
speech" or "expressive speech." This sort of expression is at the other end of the 
spectrum from "pure speech," receiving the least deference in free speech 
considerations. 
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To determine whether conduct is expressive, the Supreme Court has developed 
a standard first stated in Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974), and amplified in 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). Specifically, to be expressive conduct 
protected by the First Amendment, there must be an evidenced intent to convey a 
particularized message in the conduct and a substantial likelihood that the intended 
message would be understood by those who viewed it. This standard was easily 
applied to Spence and Johnson, both flag desecration cases, given the nature of the 
conduct and the context. 
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), 468 U.S. 288, 104 
S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984), concerned the rights of demonstrators who wanted 
to camp in Lafayette Park in Washington, D.C., to call attention to the plight of the 
homeless. In Clark, the Court considered whether or not actually sleeping in the tents 
(the specific conduct at issue) was a form of expression protected by the First 
Amendment. The Court made an important point for cases involving "expressive 
conduct." In footnote 5 of the majority opinion, the Court stated, 
Although it is common to place the burden upon the Government 
to justify impingements on First Amendment interests, it is the 
obligation of the person desiring to engage in assertedly 
expressive conduct to demonstrate that the First Amendment 
even applies. To hold otherwise would be to create a rule that all 
conduct is presumptively expressive. In the absence of a showing 
that such a rule is necessary to protect vital First Amendment 
interests, we decline to deviate from the general rule that one 
seeking relief bears the burden of demonstrating that he is 
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entitled to it. 
Clark, 468 U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. at 3080 (footnote 5). 
In his concurring opinion in Clark, Chief Justice Burger noted that while the 
"expressive sleeping" or "expressive camping" involved in that case, given its context, 
was a protected "statement," it "trivialized the First Amendment to seek to use it as a 
shield in the manner asserted here." Id., 468 U.S. at 301, 104 S.Ct. at 3073. Clearly, 
there must be a nexus between the conduct and a readily recognized message so that 
the conduct becomes the medium for the message. Otherwise, the conduct is 
meaningless. 
Such is the case here. First, Appellant has made no showing that the First 
Amendment applies to the kind of amorphous (that is, varying from individual to 
individual) social communication as described in the Brief of Appellant. Actually, the 
practice of cruising is highly analogous to the practice of recreational dancing. (Note 
Appellant's description: "It is about being seen by one's peers and meeting new 
friends. It is a cultural gathering, sprinkled with a bit of youthful and (hopefully) 
healthy rebellion." Br. of Appellant at 17.) And as the Supreme Court observed in 
Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989), there is no First Amendment protection 
for recreational dancing. "It is possible to find some kernel of expression in 
almost every activity a person undertakes ... but such a kernel is not sufficient to 
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bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment." Stanglin, 490 
U.S. at 25. 
In any event, assuming, arguendo, that this practice rises to some de minimis 
level of expressive conduct, all "[expression, whether oral or written or symbolized 
by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions." Clark, 468 
U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. at 3069. The restrictions embodied by the Cruising ordinance 
are certainly reasonable, particularly when compared to the nature of the alleged 
"communication." 
D. The Cruising Ordinance Does Not Burden the Free Exercise of Religion 
While the same could be said of Appellant's other arguments (and has been, in 
part II of this brief), the claim that "Cruising is a Religious Exercise" (Br. of 
Appellant at 18) is particularly unfounded. There is no evidence in the record to 
substantiate that cruising is a religious practice for anyone, including Appellant 
(further suggesting that the full record, including a complete transcript, should have 
been provided in this matter). 
"In a trial setting, to preserve an issue for appellate review, a 
party must first raise the issue in the trial court," giving that court 
an opportunity to rule on the issue. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal 
Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). "A trial court has the 
opportunity to rule if the following three requirements are met: 
(1) 'the issue must be raised in a timely fashion;' (2) 'the issue 
must be specifically raised;' and (3) a party must introduce 
'supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.'" Id. (quoting 
Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. 
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App.) (citations and internal quotations omitted in original), cert, 
denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997)). 
State v. McGuire, 1999 Utah App 45,16, 975 P.2d 476, 478 (emphasis added). Like 
other unsupported, undeveloped arguments in the Brief of Appellant, the assertion that 
cruising is a religious practice demands some modicum of supporting evidence. "[W]e 
hasten to emphasize that while the 'truth' of a belief is not open to question, there 
remains the significant question whether it is 'truly held.' This is the threshold 
question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case." Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185, 
85 S.Ct. at 863. The briefly asserted opinion in Appellant's trial-level memoranda that 
cruising could be religious to someone was not sufficient to preserve this issue for 
appellate review. As no transcript has been provided by Appellant, the record contains 
no other evidence in this regard. 
In any event, assuming, arguendo, that some people do "worship" (Br. of 
Appellant at 19) automobiles, this does not mean that the Cruising ordinance is 
unconstitutional. 
[U]nder the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, a 
state law that incidentally burdens the exercise of religion is 
not unconstitutional so long as the law is not intended to burden 
free exercise, is of general applicability, and is otherwise valid. 
See Employment Div. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 879, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876,110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (stating 
that Supreme Court decisions "have consistently held that the 
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general 
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) 
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conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)"' (quoting 
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3, 71 L. Ed. 2d 127, 
102 S.Ct. 1051(1982)). 
Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1249. The Free Exercise clause "'embraces two concepts,—freedom 
to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the 
second cannot be."' United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86, 64 S.Ct. 882, 886, 88 
L.Ed. 1148 (1944) (quoting Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304, 
60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213,128 A.L.R. 1352). 
To some groups, dancing is religious ritual. This does not mean that any time, 
place, or manner restriction on dancing is unconstitutional. If one blocks traffic by 
dancing in the street (or even by praying in the street), it is safe to say that person 
could lawfully be arrested or issued a citation. The Salt Lake City Council determined 
that curbing recreational driving during certain hours was a necessary safety measure, 
unrelated to any religious practices. The Automobile Worshippers are free to practice 
their ritualistic driving throughout the day from 4:00 in the morning to 11:00 at night, 
and 24 hours per day on the vast majority of City streets. 
E. The Cruising Ordinance Does Not Violate the Equal Protection Clauses 
Appellant has made no showing to indicate how the Cruising ordinance could 
be interpreted as creating classifications, let alone any showing of unlawful 
application of the law to such classifications. The Cruising ordinance applies to 
anyone traveling in a No Cruising Zone during specified hours, with limited 
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exceptions. See, infra, §G of this part, subsection 3. In other words, all similarly 
situated people are treated the same. 
Even if, arguendo, we assume that the ordinance creates a classification of 
"people who cruise," this does not mean that the classification is unconstitutional. No 
suspect or quasi-suspect classification of persons is involved here.3 The Cruising 
ordinance, as stated, applies to people of all races, genders, and ages—anyone who 
violates the traffic regulation during the specified hours and specified places. 
In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification 
that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes 
fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal 
protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state 
of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. 
[Citations omitted.] 
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993). 
The record contains no evidence indicating that the Cruising ordinance is not, 
at a minimum, rationally based. Against this lack of evidence are the findings of the 
Salt Lake City Council which were the bases for enacting the ordinance. Appellant 
admitted that those findings (which reveal a nexus between cruising and multiple 
3
 The United States Supreme Court has declined even to grant quasi-suspect status to 
individuals who are mentally challenged, a classification the Court has described as 
"large and amorphous." Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445, 
105 S.Ct. 3249, 3257, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). Obviously, that classification is far less 
amorphous than "people who cruise," and far more likely to suffer from others' 
prejudices. 
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social problems) were accurate on each and every point (Appellant's Memorandum at 
1-6), with the exception of the homicide statistics, which he "does not challenge" (Id. 
at 3). Of course, in a federal equal protection analysis, the burden is not on the 
government to defend the legislature's reasoning. 
A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence to 
sustain the rationality of a statutory classification. ... A statute is 
presumed constitutional, ... and "[t]he burden is on the one 
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every 
conceivable basis which might support it," Lehnhausen v. Lake 
Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 1006, 35 
L.Ed.2d 351 (1973)..., whether or not the basis has a foundation 
in the record. Finally, courts are compelled under rational-basis 
review to accept a legislature's generalizations even when there 
is an imperfect fit between means and ends. A classification does 
not fail rational-basis review because it "'is not made with 
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some 
inequality.'" Dandridge v. Williams, supra, 397 U.S., at 485, 90 
S.Ct., at 1161, quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 
220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911). "The 
problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if 
they do not require, rough accommodations—illogical, it may be, 
and unscientific." Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 
61, 69-70, 33 S.Ct. 441,443, 57 L.Ed. 730 (1913). [Additional 
citations omitted.] ... We have applied rational-basis review in 
previous cases involving the mentally retarded and the mentally 
ill. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 
105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); Schweikerv. Wilson, 
[450 U.S. 221, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981)]. In 
neither case did we purport to apply a different standard of 
rational-basis review from that just described. 
Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-21, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2643 (1993). 
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F. The Cruising Ordinance Upholds All Constitutional Rights, Including 
Unenumerated Rights 
In point VIII, § D, of the Brief of Appellant, Appellant asserts that "Cruising is 
an Unenumerated Right." He includes under that heading the claims that cruising "is 
an exercise of the right to travel" and "a pursuit of happiness." Br. of Appellant at 21-
22. These assertions are so cursory and lack so completely anything resembling a legal 
analysis, that Appellee is compelled to reiterate yet again its position of part II of this 
brief: Appellant's arguments are not sufficiently briefed to merit a response. 
That said, Appellee will attempt to bear the "burden of argument and research" 
(Jaeger at ^ 31) as well as possible faced with such broad assertions. Given the 
vagueness of Appellant's point VIII, it seems appropriate to proceed like the Court of 
Appeals of Wisconsin did in interpreting a cruising ordinance similar to Salt Lake 
City's. In Scheunemann v. City of West Bend, 507 N.W.2d 163 (Wis. App. 1993), the 
state appellate court found that the "common foundation" for multiple constitutional 
challenges was really a "constitutional right to travel." Scheunemann at 166. 
Those [challenges] include (1) the inherent and fundamental 
liberty rights recognized in the Wisconsin Constitution ... (2) the 
ninth amendment to the federal Constitution providing that "[t]he 
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people"; (3) 
the tenth amendment...; and (4) the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. 
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Id, footnote 4. The issue of a right of intrastate travel seems to encompass the core of 
Appellant's point VIII, as well as addressing the general concept of liberty broadly 
asserted throughout the Brief of Appellant. 
Appellant's sole reference to authority in his point VIII is to the United States 
Supreme Court case, Chicago v. Morales, No. 97-1121 (decided June 10, 1999). 
Therefore, that recent and widely publicized opinion will be addressed first, before 
moving on to a more general analysis of the right to travel. 
I. Chicago v. Morales Exemplifies the Strengths of the Cruising Ordinance 
Chicago v. Morales only exemplifies the strengths of Salt Lake City's Cruising 
ordinance. The main Morales opinion and its several concurring opinions can be 
distilled into the Court's statement, "[T]he city [of Chicago] has enacted an ordinance 
that affords too much discretion to the police and too little notice to citizens who wish 
to use the public streets." Chicago v. Morales, No. 97-1121 (U.S. June 10, 1999; 
Court opinion, paragraph one of section VI). Contrary to the Chicago ordinance at 
issue in Morales, the Salt Lake City Cruising ordinance provides notice to citizens 
with mechanical, numerical precision as to what conduct is prohibited, when, and 
where. Unlike the "publicly undisclosed[ ] enforcement areas" (Id., first paragraph of 
Morales opinion) of Chicago's anti-loitering ordinance, Salt Lake City's No Cruising 
zones are clearly described, publicly disclosed, and posted. Of all criminal and traffic 
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laws in the state of Utah, Salt Lake City's Cruising ordinance probably provides the 
most clear and conspicuous notice. 
It is also the precision of the Cruising ordinance that limits the level of 
discretion afforded to police. (See also § G of this part, subsection 3, infra.) With 
specifically named exceptions and a specifically defined offense, police officers 
enforcing the Cruising ordinance are left with almost no discretion. The average patrol 
officer exercises more discretion in deciding whether a car cleared an intersection or 
ran a red light. He or she exercises more discretion when deciding whether a group of 
young men are engaging in good-natured shenanigans or unlawful disorderly conduct. 
Under Salt Lake City's Cruising ordinance, arbitrary enforcement is almost 
impossible. With no disrespect intended, the police are essentially "bean counters" in 
this role; three beans equals a citation. 
Prosecutors and the courts are subject to the same limitations. There is no "net" 
set up to "catch all possible offenders," leaving it for "the courts to step inside and 
say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large." Id., sixth 
paragraph of section IV, Morales opinion, quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 
214, 221 (1876). An offender is an offender, based on the time, place, and manner of 
his or her actions. 
Appellant has carefully selected phrases from the Morales opinion that exhort 
important, but extremely broad, references to the right to move about freely. These 
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concepts will be addressed in the following section, in the context of other courts' 
analyses of cruising ordinances. However, Appellee emphasizes in advance that one 
person's right to move about "according to inclination" {Id., as quoted in Br. of 
Appellant at 22) ends when that movement infringes on others' rights. 
2. The Cruising Ordinance Does Not Unconstitutionally Burden, and In Fact 
Protects, Any Constitutional Right of Intrastate Travel 
Cities in many states, for over ten years now, have maintained ordinances 
similar to Salt Lake City's Cruising ordinance. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit, in addressing the constitutionality of a York, Pennsylvania, cruising 
ordinance similar to that of Salt Lake City, ruled that there is a fundamental right of 
intrastate travel arising out of substantive due process. Based on that threshold 
finding, the court ruled that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of 
review, requiring that the ordinance be narrowly tailored to meet significant—but "not 
necessarily compelling"—City objectives. Lutz v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 899 
F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 1990). By analogy to the jurisprudence of free speech in the 
First Amendment context, the Lutz court held that certain time, place, and manner 
restrictions could be placed on the right of intrastate travel. 
The freedom of speech is expressly enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights itself, and the [United States Supreme] Court, citing the 
"transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected 
expression," [ ] often creates for it especially protective doctrines 
that could be—but are not—applied to protected rights 
33 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
generally.[ ] Nonetheless, the time, place and manner doctrine 
allows certain restriction on speech to survive under less than 
fully strict scrutiny. If the freedom of speech itself can be so 
qualified, then surely the unenumerated right of localized travel 
can be as well 
Id. at 269 (emphasis added). This said, the Lutz court found that the York, 
Pennsylvania, ordinance met the requirements of intermediate scrutiny: 
We believe that the cruising ordinance passes muster as a 
reasonable time, place and manner restriction on the right of 
localized intrastate travel. York's interests in ensuring public 
safety and reducing the significant congestion caused by cruising 
are plainly significant. The ordinance is limited in its scope to 
locations undisputedly affected by the current cruising problem, 
and it leaves open ample alternative routes to get about town 
without difficulty. It prohibits only certain repetitive driving 
around the loop, and it prohibits no one from driving outside the 
loop, or from driving to the loop and then walking anywhere 
inside the loop—a distance no more than several blocks. Under 
these circumstances, we conclude that the ordinance is narrowly 
tailored to combating the safety and congestion problems 
identified by the city. 
Id. at 270. 
Appellee proposes that the appropriate standard of review is a rational basis 
test rather than intermediate scrutiny. In the absence of an issue of a fundamental right 
or a suspect classification, Utah courts, like their federal counterparts, will apply the 
rational basis test in determining whether the City's actions pass constitutional muster. 
See, e.g., Skokos v. Corradini, 900 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). That test 
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determines whether there is a rational relationship between the purpose to be 
accomplished and the means used to accomplish that purpose. 
In the instant case, there is no fundamental right which is at stake. Although a 
right to travel in interstate commerce has been recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court, (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1329, 22 
L.Ed.2d 600 (1969)), that Court has not extended the right to intrastate travel. Also, 
there is no suspect classification here. All persons without respect to race, age, gender, 
disability, or other classification who come under the category of "cruising" are 
subject to the ordinance. 
Applying the rational basis test, there is clearly a rational relationship between 
the goals of the ordinance (reducing crime, noise, congestion, pollution and other ills 
created by the cruising activity) and the means of accomplishing those goals, namely 
setting up a mechanism to prevent repeated driving along certain specified areas of the 
city during certain hours of the night. 
However, even if this Court agrees with the ruling of the Lutz court that there is 
a fundamental right of intrastate travel and that the standard of intermediate scrutiny is 
appropriate, Salt Lake City's ordinance, like the York, Pennsylvania ordinance upheld 
in Lutz, easily meets that test. Salt Lake City's Cruising ordinance actually covers a 
time frame that is more narrow than that involved in Lutz: 11:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m., as 
opposed to 7:00 p.m. to 3:30 a.m. in York, Pennsylvania (an additional 3.5 hours). Salt 
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Lake City's ordinance leaves open ample alternative routes to get about town without 
difficulty. It prohibits only certain repetitive driving past a clearly identified control 
point. It prohibits no one from driving on streets other than where the control point is 
located or from driving to the control point and walking past the control point as many 
times as desired. Under these circumstances, the City's ordinance is narrowly tailored 
to address the safety, congestion, pollution, and other problems identified by the 
City's legislative representatives. 
Appellant has acknowledged the laundry list of cruising-related problems 
identified by the City Council (Appellant's Memorandum at 1-6). In the Brief of 
Appellant, he acknowledges that "[t]he US [sic] and Utah constitutions clearly protect 
Appellant's right to cruise when not violating the equal rights of others." Br. of 
Appellant at 23 (emphasis added). Appellant, however fails to put the two together, to 
acknowledge that use of public roads at a certain time, place, and manner—namely 
cruising the same stretch for recreational purposes in the middle of the night—does 
violate the rights of others. That is what the City Council decided. Nevertheless, 
Defendant ignores the fact that the freedom to travel extends equally to those "others." 
The right to intrastate travel is a two-edged sword. The general populace 
(outside those who use city streets for recreational cruising) also retain the right of 
intrastate travel. For example, they have the right to get to the night shift at work on 
time, to get home from the theater and go to bed, or to get to the all-night pharmacist 
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when needed. They have a right to the benefit of others' right of travel as well, such as 
receiving emergency assistance that is not unnecessarily delayed. 
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, while interpreting another cruising 
ordinance similar to Salt Lake City's, adopted this same perspective. 
The city's cruising ordinance is not one which merely promotes a 
self-serving interest of government at the expense of the 
constitutional right of the people to freedom of movement. 
Rather, the purpose of the ordinance is to create a safer and less 
congested public street so that the general populace might more 
easily travel the area in question. Viewed from this perspective, it 
can be said that the ordinance enhances rather than restricts the 
constitutional right to travel. 
Scheunemann at 167 (emphasis in original). Several years later, the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin reviewed several other Wisconsin cities' cruising ordinances in 
Brandmiller v. Arreola, 544 N.W.2d 894, 900 (Wis. 1996). The Wisconsin high court 
adopted both the perspective and language of the Scheunemann court quoted above. 
As the prosecution indicated at the trial level in this case, Appellant may have 
pointed out the best reason for adopting a narrowly tailored cruising ordinance like 
that of Salt Lake City: protecting the constitutional right to travel. 
G. Appellant has Failed to Raise Additional Constitutional Arguments that 
were Raised Superficially in His Trial-level Memoranda. 
In its Minute Entry and Order, the trial court held as follows: 
The Court agrees with plaintiff that defendant's Memoranda do 
not generally provide either the precise bases for the Motion or 
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the level of analysis usually expected, but sufficient relevant 
constitutional challenges are raised in a comprehensible, albeit 
[in a] very general and scattered manner, [so] that a resolution on 
the merits of the challenge is appropriate. 
Minute Entry and Order at 1. Among those "general and scattered" challenges, the 
trial court found that Appellant "appealed] to raise the following issues, among 
others: freedom of movement, overbreadth, vagueness, freedom of speech, fairness, 
arbitrary enforcement and equal protection." Id. at 2. Issues of overbreadth, 
vagueness, and arbitrary enforcement, however, are noticeably lacking in the Brief of 
Appellant. Because there has been no analysis of these doctrines, this Court should not 
consider them now. However, should this Court determine that a review of these 
doctrines is appropriate, Appellee's analyses follow. 
1. The Cruising Ordinance is Sufficiently Clear and Explicit to Inform the 
Ordinary Person of Common Intelligence What Conduct is Prohibited. 
The basic test of vagueness was spelled out by the Utah Supreme Court in State 
v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987): 
"Vagueness" goes to the issue of procedural due process, i.e., 
whether the statute is sufficiently explicit and clear to inform the 
ordinary reader of common intelligence what conduct is 
prohibited. 
Id. at 505. See also, State v. Pilcher, 636 P.2d 470, 471 (Utah 1981). 
The test for "vagueness" requires that a statute or ordinance defines an offense 
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
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prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.4 Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991). 
See also, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1958, 75 L.Ed.2d 
903 (1983). 
It is obvious from an examination of Salt Lake City's Cruising ordinance that it 
satisfies this vagueness test. The ordinance very clearly and specifically sets forth 
what conduct is prohibited. That is, that "no person shall drive or permit a motor 
vehicle under his/her care, custody, or control to be driven in an area posted as a 
traffic congested area past a Traffic Control Point in a particular direction more than 
two times between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m." Salt Lake City Code 
12.12.090 §C. The ordinance further requires that "every no cruising area shall be 
posted with sufficient signs to provide notice of the prohibition," and that "signs shall 
be of such size and shape, as the Transportation Engineer shall deem appropriate in 
carrying out the Transportation Engineer's duties" in preparing such signs. Id. at §E. 
Certainly the subject ordinance is sufficiently explicit and clear to inform the 
ordinary reader of common intelligence what conduct is prohibited. 
4
 In one trial-level memorandum, Appellant asserted that the Cruising ordinance "is 
unconstitutional because it is impossible to give adequate notice to visitors." 
Defendant's Response, point 8, §E. This statement could be interpreted as a claim of 
unconstitutional vagueness, although there is no requirement under constitutional or 
statutory law that visitors to a city or state be individually informed of every law they 
might encounter. However, as indicated in the Statement of Facts, supra, the public 
was extensively and repeatedly informed about the ordinance. 
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Interestingly, "vagueness" was the primary rationale used by one court to strike 
a cruising ordinance. The opinion of State v. Stallman, 519 N.W.2d 903 (Minn. App. 
1994), however, is a poor example of constitutional (or even logical) analysis, and can 
be distinguished. The Stallman court adopts the "right of intrastate travel" analysis of 
the federal Third Circuit's Lutz decision and its accompanying application of an 
intermediate level of scrutiny. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision in 
Scheunemann is also praised and its reasoning described as "particularly instructive." 
Stallman at 906. 
Nevertheless, rather than applying the same kind of well-defined analyses 
found in Lutz and Scheunemann, the Stallman court drifts between an overbreadth and 
vagueness analysis, and appears to be applying its own public policy preferences as 
opposed to applying principles of constitutional law. Since the Stallman court claimed 
to strike the Anoka, Minnesota ordinance as "unconstitutional on its face by reason of 
vagueness," {Stallman at 910), the Stallman opinion will be discussed here. 
Following its adoption of the Lutz standard of review, the Stallman court 
summarized its vagueness/overbreadth hybrid as follows: 
Even applying an intermediate level of scrutiny, this ordinance is 
far from being narrowly and reasonably tailored. From the totality 
of the record, it is far too sweeping, and allows unimpeded and 
arbitrary decisionmaking by the police as to who to stop, and who 
to cite or let go. This sweeping breadth is unnecessary to attack 
Anoka's purported problem. 
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Stallman at 907. 
The Stallman court's concern over "arbitrary decisionmaking" presents the best 
example of the poor logic in this decision, at least when contrasted with the court's 
second great concern. That second concern is the fact that the Anoka ordinance lacked 
an "excuse clause" like that in the ordinance upheld in Wisconsin in Scheunemann. 
The Stallman court thinks so highly of the "excuse clause" that it adds emphasis to its 
own text on the subject: "The [Wisconsin] ordinance also allowed the driver to give 
an explanation that the driving was ...for a lawful purpose " Stallman at 907 
(emphasis in original). The court repeats this point: "Most importantly, the West Bend 
ordinance [of Scheunemann] allows drivers to offer a lawful explanation..." Id. at 
908. 
Strangely, the Stallman court fails to notice any conflict between the excuse 
clause and the court's fear of "arbitrary decisionmaking by the police as to who ... to 
cite or let go."5 Id. at 907. Nevertheless, the concept of an excuse provision cuts 
directly against the Stallman court's own rationale for striking the Anoka's cruising 
ordinance: vagueness. One of the primary functions of the vagueness doctrine is to 
curb discretion afforded to police, which could result in unconstitutional applications 
of the law. 
5
 For a discussion of the concern over arbitrary enforcement, see, infra, subsection 3 
of this section and part. 
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This is exactly what the Wisconsin Supreme Court held in Brandmiller 
(decided after Stallmari): "[T]he fact that the ordinances [of three Wisconsin cities] 
lack an opportunity for an 'on the scene' explanation makes an officer's possible 
abuse of discretion less likely." Brandmiller at 901. Like the Wisconsin ordinances in 
Brandmiller, the Salt Lake City ordinance applies to everyone equally; officers are 
afforded even less discretion than with other traffic regulations. 
The next concern of the Stallman court is that the cruising-related problems 
that inspired the Anoka ordinance are already defined as criminal violations. This 
point was raised by Defendant in his responses to the "City Council Legislative 
Findings of Fact." Defendant's Response, point 2. First, this argument ignores other 
legitimate reasons for the Cruising ordinance, such as the traffic congestion that 
results from the sheer number of cars. Second, it is ludicrous to suggest that laws 
cannot be passed as preventive measures. Most traffic laws, in fact, are in place to 
prevent more serious incidents and offenses from occurring, as well as to simply 
coordinate the flow of traffic. If a traffic signal is placed at a busy intersection, we do 
not say that there are already defined offenses for Improper Lookout, Negligent 
Collision, right-of-way and stop sign violations, and "road rage" crimes. 
Next, the Stallman court actually suggests that placing No Cruising signs 
directly outside of fire and ambulance stations would be a more "narrow" application 
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of the ordinance. The reality, of course, is that an ambulance that can leave its bay 
unhampered still has to go up the street to get anywhere. 
The Stallman court also suggests a concern that the ordinance could be used to 
inappropriately target an "'undesirable' class of people, namely teenagers ... ." 
Stallman at 908. Incredibly, the court states that the lack of an excuse clause would 
add to this potential problem because an "undesirable" person would receive a ticket 
no matter what excuse he or she presented. Again, the court seems to forget its own 
concern about arbitrary enforcement. 
Finally, three elements that caught the Stallman court's attention are factually 
different than the Salt Lake City situation. First, the Anoka cruising prohibition 
extended from 9:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. Salt Lake City's prohibition avoids additional 
work-related traffic with its 11-4 period. Second, judging by the examples given in 
the Stallman opinion, the Anoka ordinance required three passes in either direction to 
create a violation. (See Stallman at 909.) Salt Lake City's ordinance requires three or 
more passes in the same direction. Finally, Anoka's signs stated only "No Cruising 
9:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m." Salt Lake City's signs define the offense with specifics. (See 
Statement of Facts, supra, in this brief.) 
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2. The Cruising Ordinance Satisfies Constitutional Overbreadth Concerns 
Statutory language is overbroad if it proscribes both harmful and innocuous 
behavior. Stated another way, a statute is overbroad if it attempts to sanction 
constitutionally protected activities. Elks Lodges v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage 
Control 905 P.2d 1189, 1203 (Utah 1995), cert, denied, 517 U.S. 1221, 116 S.Ct. 
1850, 134 L.Ed.2d 950 (1996); State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 192 (Utah 1987). 
In Lutz, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that an overbreadth claim is 
inapplicable outside the context of the First Amendment: 
Nothing in the basic logic of the doctrine is specific to the 
First Amendment. In principle, an argument could be made for 
allowing facial challenges based on overbreadth to statutes that 
reach any kind of protected activity. However, because striking 
down a statute in its entirety, even if it has constitutional 
applications, is such a strong remedy, the doctrine is a "narrow" 
one generally disfavored. See New York State Club Association v. 
City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 108 S.Ct. 2225, 2233, 101 L.Ed.2d 
1 (1988). It is allowed in the First Amendment context only 
because of "the transcendent value to all society of 
constitutionally protected expression," Gooding, 405 U.S. at 521, 
92 S.Ct. at 1105, and has never been recognized outside the First 
Amendment context. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 
745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2100, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). 
LutzztHl. 
Because the appellant in Lutz had dropped its First Amendment claim, the court 
did not reach that issue. Two Wisconsin courts, however, have found that ordinances 
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similar Salt Lake City's were not unconstitutionally overbroad.6 In Scheunemann v. 
Wisconsin, 507 N.W.2d 163 (Wis. App. 1993), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
considered an overbreadth challenge based in the First Amendment right of assembly. 
The cruising ordinance in that case was "specifically limited ... to a designated daily 
time span ('between the hours of 8:00 P.M. and 4:00 A.M.') and to a designated area 
('Main Street between Paradise Drive and Washington Street')." Scheunemann at 166. 
(Note the additional three hours of the time span when compared to the Salt Lake City 
ordinance.) The Scheunemann court held as follows: 
[T]his cruising ordinance carefully carves out, on both a spatial 
and temporal basis, a narrow slice of driving conduct for 
regulation. Given these limitations, we conclude that the city has 
satisfactorily demonstrated that the cruising ordinance is not 
unconstitutionally overbroad. 
Id. 
In Brandmiller, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered overbreadth 
challenges of three cities' cruising ordinances. The time spans of those ordinances 
were nearly double that of Salt Lake City's ordinance, running nine hours from 8:00 
p.m. to 5:00 a.m. As previously mentioned, the Brandmiller court found that the lack 
of an excuse clause actually supported the constitutionality of the ordinances. 
... [T]he lack of an intent element and an opportunity to 
6
 The Minnesota Court of Appeals' overbreadth/vagueness/public policy decision of 
State v. Stallman, 519 N.W.2d 903 (Minn. App. 1994), is discussed in subsection 1 of 
this section and part, supra. 
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explain does not render the ordinances unconstitutional. 
The cruising ordinances are narrowly tailored to deal with the 
unquestioned problems associated with cruising. The ordinances 
are limited in time to those hours of the day where cruising was 
shown to be a problem. They are limited to those streets where 
the Municipalities experienced cruising. They set forth the 
standards for cruising: three vehicular passes of a control point 
within a two-hour period. There are also numerous exceptions for 
vehicles operating with governmental or business purposes. 
Thus, these cruising ordinances carefully carve out a narrow slice 
of driving conduct for regulation. Scheunemann, ..., 507 N.W.2d 
163. Given these limitations, we conclude that the Municipalities 
have satisfactorily demonstrated that the cruising ordinances are 
not unconstitutionally broad. 
Brandmiller at 902. 
Based on the information quoted above, it appears that the three cruising 
ordinances of Brandmiller were very similar to the Salt Lake City ordinance, with the 
exception of the greater time spans. And likewise, the Cruising ordinance before this 
Court is not unconstitutionally overbroad. 
3. The Cruising Ordinance Provides Sufficient Standards to Avoid an 
Unbridled Delegation of Legislative Authority to Police. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that a legislative enactment must 
establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. A determination must be 
made as to whether the ordinance "necessarily entrusts law-making to the moment-to-
moment judgment of the policeman on his beat." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 
358-359 (1983). One authority has stated the rule as follows: 
46 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A delegation of power, even to a city agent, will be allowed only 
where that power is administrative, executive, or ministerial in 
nature; the law-making and policy-formulating powers must 
remain in the City legislative body. Any delegation of power by 
the city's legislative body must be accompanied with adequate 
standards to guide the exercise of power by the agent or body to 
whom that delegation is made. ... If adequate guidelines do not 
accompany a delegation of authority, then the person or body to 
whom this is delegated is left to formulate the necessary 
standards and limitation—and much formulation is really a 
law-making chore, not mere administration. 
Reynolds, Osborne M., Jr., Local Government Law, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 
Minn. 1982, at 162. (Numbering deleted.) 
In enacting the subject ordinance, the Salt Lake City Council was very careful 
to set forth clear and precise standards for the exercise of police discretion. 
Specific "no cruising zones" were identified by the City Council as being 
"traffic congestion areas" where the problems identified in the Council's findings had 
been found. The only variation from the Council's previously identified traffic 
congestion areas are "mobile traffic control points" which may be established by an 
officer of the rank of sergeant or higher creating a written plan describing: (1) the 
location of the traffic control point; (2) the date, time and location of the traffic 
control point; (3) any instructions given to the enforcement officers concerning the 
traffic control point; (4) a brief statement outlining the problem(s) which resulted in 
the choosing of the date, time and location of the temporary traffic congestion area; 
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and (5) the location of the warning signs. Salt Lake City Code 12.12.090 §§B and F. 
The case at hand did not involve such a mobile traffic control point. 
When enforcing the Cruising ordinance at any traffic control point, the police 
are granted no discretion in which vehicles are to be stopped and which drivers cited. 
The exemptions to the application of the ordinance are set out specifically, including: 
(1) any publicly owned vehicle while in the performance of public duties; (2) any 
vehicle license for public transportation, including but not limited to, buses and 
taxicabs; (3) any in-service emergency vehicle; and (4) any vehicle being driven by a 
resident of the traffic congestion area, or any vehicle being driven within the traffic 
congestion area for necessary commercial or medical reasons. Id. at §D. 
The specifically and clearly delineated standards governing police action set 
forth in the ordinance show that the City Council's delegation of discretion is carefully 
limited and thus meets constitutional guidelines. 
CONCLUSION 
For the most part, Appellant's brief consists of declarations of the broadest 
possible nature concerning his political beliefs and his own interpretations of the place 
of federal and state constitutions in American law. Little authority or legal analysis 
has been provided. Due to the inadequacy of the Appellant's briefing, the issues 
before the court are too broad and too vague to merit further review or oral argument. 
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The exercise of police powers by Salt Lake City's legislative body to address 
the concerns of public health, safety, and welfare by enacting the Cruising ordinance 
was consistent with the general grant of power contained in Utah Code § 10-8-84 and 
other enabling statutes. That ordinance was enacted as an infraction-level offense, and 
therefore Appellant was not entitled to a jury trial. 
Appellant has provided little or no analysis in his brief, let alone an analysis 
that meets his burden of overcoming the presumption of validity and constitutionality 
that is properly accorded to municipal ordinances. His reference to the Tenth 
Amendment is misplaced, as that amendment is a restriction on federal power. His 
reference to freedom of expression is completely unsubstantiated. With regard to his 
assertions regarding the free exercise of religion, again, Appellant's bald assertions 
that cruising could be religious to someone are not sufficient to merit appellate review. 
Similarly, Appellant has not met his burden in asserting a violation of the Equal 
Protection clauses. 
Appellant claims further that the Cruising ordinance violates unenumerated 
rights of the United States Constitution. As several appellate courts have found in 
other jurisdictions, however, the right of intrastate travel is subject to reasonable time, 
place, and manner restrictions. Salt Lake City's Cruising ordinance is a narrowly 
tailored ordinance that satisfies all constitutional concerns. 
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Appellee is confident that, should this Court decide to consider the 
"arguments" of Appellant's brief, it will find that the Cruising ordinance will 
withstand all constitutional challenges. Therefore, Appellee respectfully requests that 
this Court affirm the conviction in this matter without oral argument. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £ day of June, 2000. 
Assistant City Prosecutor 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
Statutes and rules cited in this brief 
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Salt Lake City Code 
1.12.50 Violation-Penalty 
Any person convicted of violating any provision of the ordinances codified in 
this code, or ordinances hereafter enacted, shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor 
unless otherwise specified in such ordinance, or interpreted by the court as a Class C 
misdemeanor or infraction, and shall be punished as follows: 
A. In the case of a Class B misdemeanor, by a fine in any sum not 
exceeding one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for a term not longer than six 
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment; 
B. In the case of a Class C misdemeanor, by a fine in any sum not 
exceeding five hundred dollars or by imprisonment for a term not longer than ninety 
days, or by both such fine and imprisonment; 
C. In the case of an infraction, by a fine in any sum not exceeding five 
hundred dollars; 
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Salt Lake City Code 
12.12.090 Cruising 
A. Findings: 
1. The Salt Lake City Council, after hearing, makes the following legislative 
findings: 
a. Cruising has created a traffic problem on various City streets by causing a 
steady stream of vehicles to be unable to clear intersections, thus blocking traffic. The 
traffic blocking is most noticeable downtown on the east-west bound traffic as they 
are blocked by the north-south traffic stopped in intersections. It is also noticeable on 
the north-south traffic in the Sugar House area, as vehicles heading north or south are 
unable to move through intersections due to traffic on 2100 South. 
b. The blocked traffic has contributed to motorist frustration and resultant 
dangerous driving to either avoid the gridlock or dangerous maneuvers around the 
blocked intersections. 
c. Emergency vehicles have difficulty maneuvering through the blocked 
intersections and traveling along the roads choked with traffic. 
d. Traffic along City streets has increased forty percent (40%) since 1997, and 
accidents have more than doubled. 
e. The traffic creates noise of automobiles, horns, engines, screeching tires, 
etc., that disrupts residents' quiet enjoyment of night. 
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Salt Lake City Code, Cruising, 12.12.090, continued 
f. Motorist frustration has resulted in some violent episodes commonly called 
"road rage". 
g. In addition to the road rage that exists among the general population, gang 
members express their frustration and flash gang signs challenging everyone around. 
Other gang members pick up on the signs and flash their own challenges. Such 
confrontations have resulted in two (2) homicides in the downtown area since 
August 1997. 
h. In addition, there are numerous fights, assaults with deadly weapons, and 
other physical confrontations, which have resulted from heavy traffic congestion and 
short tempers. The statistics for State Street are: 
1997 1998 
Homicides 1 1 
Assaults 402 525 
Public peace and order 1,520 1,455 
Total 1,923 1,981 
i. Statistics show that the calls for police in the downtown area peak during the 
hours of eleven o'clock (11:00) P.M. and through four o'clock (4:00) A.M. each night. 
These calls for service, in part, are caused by cruising and the problems of gridlock, 
violations of laws and improper driving caused by cruising. 
j . Statistics show that the highest demand for police service caused by gridlock, 
challenges to others and improper driving peak during Friday and Saturday nights. 
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Salt Lake City Code, Cruising, 12.12.090, continued 
k. The majority of businesses in Sugar House and downtown areas are closed 
or are closing by eleven o'clock (11:00) P.M., and very few are open after twelve 
o'clock (12:00) midnight. Thus there is little business reason for traffic congestion 
from eleven o'clock (11:00) P.M. to four o'clock (4:00) A.M. Those businesses, which 
have large populations leaving, such as events at the Delta Center and Symphony Hall 
contribute to traffic congestion, but the persons attending have no reason to, and in 
large part do not "cruise the area" as "cruising" is defined in this Section. 
1. Commercial parking is available in the traffic congested areas of Sugar 
House and downtown. Because of the availability of commercial parking, persons, 
during the hours of eleven o'clock (11:00) P.M. to four o'clock (4:00) A.M. have little 
need to "cruise the area" looking for public parking stalls. 
m. Elimination of those who "cruise the streets" simply as "something to do" 
will eliminate the vast majority of traffic congestion, noise associated with 
automobiles, and the resultant dangerous driving and "road rage" during the target 
hours of eleven o'clock (11:00) P.M. and four o'clock (4:00) A.M. in the downtown 
and Sugar House areas. 
n. Traffic accidents have increased Citywide since the fall of 1997. Many traffic 
accidents occur which involve people cruising while drinking alcohol. Many 
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Salt Lake City Code, Cruising, 12.12.090, continued 
drivers who are cruising are impaired as they consume alcohol or drugs while 
involved in the gridlock. 
B. Definitions: 
1. "Cruising" means the driving of a motor vehicle more than two (2) times 
between the hours of eleven o'clock (11:00) P.M. and four o'clock (4:00) A.M., in a 
particular direction, past a traffic-control point. 
2. "Mobile traffic-control point" means at any point or points within the traffic 
congested area established by the Police Department for the purpose of monitoring 
violations of law. 
3. "Traffic congestion area" shall mean any area designated and posted as a no-
cruising area in Schedule 5, set out in Chapter 12.104 of this Title, or any area 
designated and posted as a temporary no-cruising area. 
C. Cruising Action Prohibited: No person shall drive or permit a motor 
vehicle under his/her care, custody, or control to be driven in an area posted as a 
traffic congested area past a traffic-control point in a particular direction more than 
two (2) times between the hours of eleven o'clock (11:00) P.M. and four o'clock (4:00) 
A.M. 
D. Exemptions: This Chapter shall not apply to: 
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Salt Lake City Code, Cruising, 12.12.090, continued 
1. Any publicly owned vehicle of any City, County, political subdivision, State, 
or Federal agency while in the performance of public duties. 
2. Any vehicle licensed for public transportation, including, but not limited to, 
buses and taxicabs. 
3. Any in-service emergency vehicle. 
4. Any vehicle being driven by a resident of the traffic congestion area, or any 
vehicle being driven within the traffic congestion area for necessary commercial or 
medical reasons. 
E. Warning Signs Required: 
1. Every no-cruising area shall be posted with sufficient signs to provide notice 
of the prohibition. 
2. Signs shall be of such size and shape, as the Transportation Engineer shall 
deem appropriate in carrying out the Transportation Engineer's duties as set forth in 
Sections 12.08.080 and 12.08.090 of this Title. 
F. Temporary No-Cruising Zones And Traffic-Control Points: Mobile 
traffic-control point or points may be established by an officer of the rank of sergeant 
or higher, creating a written plan describing: 1) the location of the traffic-control 
point; 2) the date, time and location of the traffic-control point; 3) any instructions 
given to the enforcement officers concerning the traffic-control point; 4) a brief 
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statement outlining the problem(s) which resulted in the choosing of the date, 
time and location of the temporary traffic congestion area; and 5) the location of the 
warning signs. 
(Ord. 40-99 §§ 1,2,1999) 
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Utah Code Annotated 
§ 10-8-30 Traffic regulations. 
They may regulate the movement of traffic on the streets, sidewalks and public 
places, including the movement of pedestrians as well as of vehicles, and the cars and 
engines of railroads, street railroads and tramways, and may prevent racing and 
immoderate driving or riding. 
§ 10-8-60 Nuisances. 
They may declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate the same, and impose 
fines upon persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist. 
§ 10-8-69 Annoying pastimes in streets. 
They may prohibit or regulate the rolling of hoops, playing of ball, flying of 
kites, riding of bicycles or tricycles, or any other amusements or practices having a 
tendency to annoy persons passing in the streets or on sidewalks, or to frighten teams 
of horses, or to interfere with traffic. 
§ 10-8- 76 Noise abatement-Street performances. 
They may prevent the ringing of bells, blowing of horns and bugles, crying of 
goods by auctioneers and others, and the making of other noises, for the purpose of 
59 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
business, amusement or otherwise, and prevent all performances and devices tending 
to the collection of persons on the streets or sidewalks of the city. 
§ 10-8-84 Ordinances, rules, and regulations - Passage - Penalties. 
They may pass all ordinances and rules, and make all regulations, not 
repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all powers and 
duties conferred by this chapter, and as are necessary and proper to provide for the 
safety and preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace 
and good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for the 
protection of property in the city; and may enforce obedience to the ordinances with 
fines or penalties as they may deem proper, but the punishment of any offense shall be 
by fine not to exceed the maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section 76-3-301 
or by imprisonment not to exceed six months, or by both the fine and imprisonment. 
§ 76-3-205 Infraction conviction - Fine, forfeiture, and disqualification. 
(1) A person convicted of an infraction may not be imprisoned but may be 
subject to a fine, forfeiture, and disqualification, or any combination. 
(2) Whenever a person is convicted of an infraction and no punishment is 
specified, the person may be fined as for a class C misdemeanor. 
§ 76-3-301 Fines of persons. 
(1) A person convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, not exceeding: 
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(a) $10,000 for a felony conviction of the first degree or second degree; 
(b) $5,000 for a felony conviction of the third degree; 
(c) $2,500 for a class A misdemeanor conviction; 
(d) $1,000 for a class B misdemeanor conviction; 
(e) $750 for a class C misdemeanor conviction or infraction conviction; and 
(f) any greater amounts specifically authorized by statute. 
(2) This section does not apply to a corporation, association, partnership, 
government, or governmental instrumentality. 
§ 77-17-10 Court to determine law; the jury, the facts. 
(1) In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court, 
questions of fact by the jury. 
(2) The jury may find a general verdict which includes questions of law as 
well as fact but they are bound to follow the law as stated by the court. 
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Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 9(a) 
(a) Time for filing. Within 21 days after a notice of appeal, cross-appeal, or a 
petition for review is filed, the appellant, cross-appellant, or petitioner shall file a 
docketing statement with the clerk of the appellate court. An original and two copies 
of the docketing statement shall be filed with the court. 
Rule 11(a), (e)(l)-(2) 
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits filed 
in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared by the clerk 
of the trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute the record on appeal in all 
cases. A copy of the record certified by the clerk of the trial court to conform to the 
original may be substituted for the original as the record on appeal. Only those papers 
prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the appellate court. 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to 
appellee if partial transcript is ordered. 
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the notice 
of appeal, the appellant shall request from the court executive a transcript of such 
parts of the proceedings not already on file as the appellant deems necessary. The 
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request shall be in writing and shall state that the transcript is needed for purposes of 
an appeal. Within the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court 
and the clerk of the appellate court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a 
compressed format, appellant shall include the request for a compressed format within 
the request for transcript. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, 
within the same period the appellant shall file a certificate to that effect with the clerk 
of the trial court and a copy with the clerk of the appellate court. 
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or 
conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is 
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record 
a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court 
nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the 
relevant portions of the transcript. 
Rule 24(a)(9) 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: ... 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
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parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all 
record evidence that supports the challenged finding. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Constitution of the United States 
Amendment I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances. 
Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the 
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
Amendment X 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. 
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Amendment XIV, Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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